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I.

INTRODUCTION

When scholars speak of the Burger Court, they often mention
the curtailing of individual rights in the criminal justice arena,1
federalism decisions,2 its “rootless activism,”3 a failure in equal

†
David L. Hudson, Jr., is a Justice Robert H. Jackson Legal Fellow with the
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) and the Newseum Institute
First Amendment Fellow. He teaches at the Nashville School of Law and Vanderbilt
Law School. He would like to thank his co-author Emily Harvey, the student editors
of the Mitchell Hamline Law Review, and Azhar Majeed of FIRE.
†† Emily H. Harvey is the senior judicial law clerk for the Hon. Frank G.
Clement, Jr., of the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
1. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 14, 44 (1995); Steven D. Clymer, Note, Warrantless
Vehicle Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Burger Court Attacks the Exclusionary Rule,
68 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 129, 141, 144–45 (1982).
2. See David Scott Louk, Note, Repairing the Irreparable: Revisiting the Federalism
Decisions of the Burger Court, 125 YALE L.J. 682, 686–87, 694, 710, 724–25 (2016); Lea
Brilmayer & Ronald D. Lee, State Sovereignty and the Two Faces of Federalism: A
Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
833, 836, 839–40 (1985).
3. See generally Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 198–217 (Vincent Blasi
ed., 1983) (discussing the development of the judicial activism employed by the
Burger Court via various case law examples).
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protection analysis,4 significant developments in sex discrimination
law,5 or even a general lack of direction.6
Whatever its successes or failures in other areas, the Burger
Court impacted First Amendment law in a meaningful way. This
impact is best shown by the creation of three legal tests in distinct
areas of First Amendment law: the Establishment Clause, obscenity,
and commercial speech.7 These three tests are the Lemon test, the
Miller test, and the Central Hudson test.8 Despite criticism, all three
tests remain leading standards in their respective areas of First
Amendment jurisprudence.9 This article provides an overview of
each of these seminal tests, assesses how they fared in subsequent
years, and offers thoughts on their continuing vitality.10
II. THE LEMON TEST
The Lemon test comes from the Burger Court’s 1971 decision in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.11 The case involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania
law that provided financial support to nonpublic schools, including
parochial schools, in the form of teacher salaries, textbooks, and
other instructional materials.12 Alton Lemon, a member of the
American Civil Liberties Union, agreed to be the plaintiff
challenging the constitutionality of the law.13 At the Supreme Court
4. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure to
Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1000, 1015 (1994).
5. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Burger Court’s Grappling with Sex
Discrimination, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T,
supra note 3, at 132–56 (highlighting the influence of changing social and economic
conditions in the 1970s as factors affecting the Burger Court’s developed body of
law regarding sex discrimination).
6. Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1437 (1987).
7. David L. Hudson, Jr., Will Roberts Court Flip Burger Precedents?, NEWSEUM INST.
(May 9, 2008), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2008/05/09/will-roberts-courtflip-burger-precedents/ [https://perma.cc/L9V7-SXDJ] [hereinafter Hudson, Jr.,
Roberts Court].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Specifically, this article first analyzes the Lemon test, see infra Part II, next
addresses the Miller test, see infra Part III, and finally discusses the Central Hudson
test, see infra Part IV.
11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
12. Id. at 610–11.
13. David L. Hudson, Jr., Lemon Plaintiff, Out of Limelight, Still Tracks
Church-State Issues, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (May 19, 2004), http://
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level, Lemon’s case was consolidated with another case, Disenso v.
Robinson,14 from Rhode Island.15 In Disenso, the plaintiff challenged
the constitutionality of the state supplementing the salaries of
nonpublic elementary school teachers.16
In examining the statutes, Chief Justice Warren Burger
acknowledged that the language of the Establishment Clause was “at
best opaque.”17 He identified what he called “cumulative criteria”
gleaned from previous cases.18 These “cumulative criteria,” or three
tests, collectively became known as the Lemon test.19 Chief Justice
Burger explained:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster “an excessive government entanglement
with religion.”20
In its original iteration, the Lemon test had three prongs:
purpose, effect, and entanglement.21 Thus, for a governmental
program or regulation to be constitutional under the Lemon test, it
must have a secular purpose, a primary effect that does not advance
or inhibit religion, and not foster an excessive entanglement
between church and state.22 Chief Justice Burger pulled the first two
prongs from Board of Education v. Allen,23 the decision on loaning
textbooks to students attending parochial schools.24 Walz v. Tax

www.firstamendmentcenter.org/lemon-plaintiff-out-of-limelight-still-tracks-churchstate-issues/ [https://perma.cc/2DXJ-FTWC] [hereinafter Hudson, Jr., Lemon
Plaintiff].
14. 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
15. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606–07.
16. Id. at 607.
17. Id. at 612.
18. Id.
19. Hudson, Jr., Lemon Plaintiff, supra note 13.
20. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)).
21. Hudson, Jr., Lemon Plaintiff, supra note 13.
22. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (first citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242
(1968); then citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 (1970)).
23. 392 U.S. 236.
24. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
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Commission, 25 the church property tax exemption decision, formed
the basis for the last prong.26
Chief Justice Burger determined that both the Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island laws passed the purpose prong as the state legislatures
had the secular purpose of improving education.27 However, he held
that both statutes involved excessive entanglement between church
and state.28 The state laws provided that government officials would
ensure that state aid would fund only secular education.29 However,
the Court reasoned that state officials would have to engage in
comprehensive surveillance to ensure that the money was not being
used to fund religious instruction: “[a] comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be
required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First
Amendment otherwise respected.”30
The U.S. Supreme Court has used the Lemon test in many
Establishment Clause cases through the years.31 In fact, the Lemon
test was the dominant test for more than a decade.32 Despite its
widespread use, the Court has not been consistent in using the Lemon

25. 397 U.S. 664.
26. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
27. Id. (“[T]he statutes . . . are intended to enhance the quality of the secular
education in all schools . . . .”).
28. Id. at 613–14.
29. See id. at 616.
30. Id. at 619.
31. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (using the Lemon
test to invalidate a Louisiana law requiring balanced treatment of creationism and
evolution in science classes); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55 (1985) (using the
Lemon test to invalidate an Alabama moment of silence law that sought to return
prayer to the public schools); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123
(1982) (using the Lemon test to invalidate a Massachusetts law that gave churches
the power to veto liquor licenses); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 128
(1977) (using the Lemon test to invalidate a New York law allowing private schools
to recover money from the state); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 744–
45 (1976) (using the Lemon test to uphold a Maryland law that provided aid to
private religious schools).
32. Cf. Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal
Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 665, 673 (2008) (“[T]he dominant test for constitutionality under the
Establishment Clause was the . . . test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.”).
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test.33 One example is Marsh v. Chambers.34 In Marsh, the Eighth
Circuit used the Lemon test to invalidate the Nebraska legislature’s
practice of having chaplain-led prayer before sessions.35 But the
Supreme Court upheld the practice and ignored the Lemon test.36
Instead, the Supreme Court focused on the history and tradition of
opening legislative sessions with prayer.37 In response, Justice
William Brennan authored a dissenting opinion and criticized the
majority opinion for failing to apply Lemon, which he called “the
most commonly cited formulation of prevailing Establishment
Clause doctrine.”38
Marsh was only the beginning of the Court’s inconsistent use of
the Lemon test.39 For example, in examining the constitutionality of
a Ten Commandments monument in a Texas public park, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist wrote in 2005: “Whatever may be the fate
of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of
passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds.”40
While some justices have defended the Lemon test,41 several
Justices have also criticized it. Most colorfully, Justice Antonin Scalia
referred to it as a “ghoul in a late-night horror movie” that “stalks
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”42 He voted to grant

33. See Amy J. Alexander, When Life Gives You the Lemon Test: An Overview of the
Lemon Test and Its Application, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 641, 649 (2010) (discussing the
inconsistent application of the Lemon test).
34. 463 U.S. 783, 783 (1983).
35. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 233–35 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 463 U.S.
783 (1983); see also Kathrik Ravinshankar, The Establishment Clause’s Hydra: The
Lemon Test in the Circuit Courts, 41 DAYTON L. REV. 261, 274 (2016) (“Perhaps
illustrating problems with the Lemon test in the legislative prayer setting, the Eighth
Circuit reached opposite conclusions in Chambers v. Marsh and Bogen v. Doty despite
applying Lemon to seemingly similar facts.”).
36. Marsh, 464 U.S. 783, 783 (1983).
37. Id. at 786.
38. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. See Alexander, supra note 33, at 642 (“The Court has continued to use [the
Lemon] test erratically, at times revising and at others despising it . . . .”).
40. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005).
41. For example, Justice Lewis Powell defended the Lemon test as “the only
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 62 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
42. Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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certiorari in a case simply to “inter” the Lemon test.43 Justice Clarence
Thomas has blasted the test as “utterly indeterminate.”44 In 1985,
then Associate Justice William Rehnquist said the test “has simply not
provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause
cases.”45 Justice Byron White wrote in 1976: “I am no more
reconciled now to Lemon than when it was decided.”46
Numerous legal commentators have also criticized the Lemon
test on a variety of grounds. Professor Jesse Choper criticized the test
for helping create a “conceptual disaster area” in aid to religious
education cases.47 Another leading commentator explained that the
test has led to inconsistent results.48 Some have attacked the purpose
prong specifically.49 Others have focused their attention on the
entanglement prong, contending that it is unnecessary or should
merely be a part of the effects prong.50
The Court has created a variety of other tests for Establishment
Clause cases. For example, as mentioned earlier, the Court used a
history and tradition analysis to uphold a state practice of having
prayer before legislative sessions.51 In another case, Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor offered “a clarification” of Lemon called the
43. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (“I would grant certiorari in this case if
only to take the opportunity to inter Lemon test once for all.”).
44. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, 565 U.S. 994, 1001 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
45. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 109 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring).
47. Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 5, 6 (1987).
48. William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”—The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 498 (1986).
49. Josh Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the
Pursuit of a Secular Legislative Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RIGHTS. L.J. 351, 407–
10 (2010); Jay Alan Sekulow & Erik Michael Zimmerman, Posting the Ten
Commandments is a “Law Respecting an Establishment of Religion?”: How McCreary
County v. ACLU Illustrates the Need to Reexamine the Lemon Test and Its Purpose Prong,
23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 25 (2006); Jeffrey S. Theuer, The Lemon Test and Subjective
Intent in Establishment Clause Analysis: The Case for Abandoning the Purpose Prong, 76 KY.
L.J. 1061 (1988).
50. See Heather S. Savage, Note, The School Voucher Debate: Recasting the Third
Prong of the Lemon Test, 45 HOW. L.J. 465, 483 (2002) (“The decisions prove that
excessive entanglement should not stand on its own, but rather should be directly
linked with the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.”).
51. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).
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“endorsement test.”52 In yet another case, Justice Anthony Kennedy
offered forth a coercion analysis.53
In 1997, the Court seemingly modified the Lemon test by folding
the entanglement prong into the effects prong.54 However, many
lower courts still apply all three prongs of the Lemon test.55 A federal
district court judge recently referred to the Lemon test as the
“benchmark” in granting preliminary injunctive relief against
President Donald Trump’s travel ban.56
In fact, while it has faced a litany of criticism, the Lemon test
survives and even thrives, particularly in the lower courts.57 As
attorney Karthik Ravishankar wrote in 2016: “The funeral procession
has arrived too early. Despite the Court’s clear ambivalence about
Lemon, the circuits continue to employ the test in the vast majority of
Establishment Clause cases.”58 One commentator claimed that
Lemon was the best test for Establishment Clause cases, particularly
in evaluating the constitutionality of graduation prayer.59
III. THE MILLER TEST
The Miller test comes from the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision
in Miller v. California.60 The test deals with obscenity, an unprotected
category of speech that has confounded numerous Supreme Court
Justices through the years.61 Justice John Marshall Harlan II famously
52. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
53. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655–79 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–34 (1997).
55. See Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 2016)
(emphasizing that the Tenth Circuit applies all three prongs of the Lemon test); Am.
Atheists, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 760 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating
that panels of this court are “required to follow this precedent”).
56. Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1235 (D. Haw. 2017) (“Lemon . . .
provides the benchmark for evaluating whether governmental action is consistent
with or at odds with the Establishment Clause.” (citations omitted)).
57. Alexander, supra note 33, at 641 (describing the Lemon test as the “leading
method” to determine whether there is an Establishment Clause violation).
58. Ravishankar, supra note 35 at 263.
59. Penny J. Meyers, Lemon is Alive and Kicking: Using the Lemon Test to
Determine the Constitutionality of Prayer at High School Graduation Ceremonies, 34 VAL. U.
L. REV. 231, 233 (1999).
60. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
61. John Fee, Obscenity and the World Wide Web; 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1691, 1691
(2007) (“Whereas the Supreme Court has held that obscenity is defined by
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referred to it as the “intractable obscenity problem.”62 More
famously, Justice Potter Stewart once wrote that he perhaps could
not intelligibly define obscenity but claimed, “I know when I see
it . . . .”63
Prior to Miller, some American courts adopted an obscenity test
from a nineteenth century English case, Regina v. Hicklin,64 known as
the Hicklin test.65 That test allowed for obscenity prosecutions based
on the impact of isolated passages on the most susceptible of
persons.66 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Hicklin test in Roth
v. United States, and instead adopted the test used by several lower
courts: “whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest.”67
In the next decade, three Justices adopted a three-part test,
sometimes called the Memoirs test, that required: “(a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest
in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly
without redeeming social value.”68
However, as indicated, only three Justices agreed with the
Memoirs formulation.69 This eventually caused the Supreme Court to
review obscenity cases on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis in a process
known as “Redruping”70—after the Court’s decision in Redrup v. New
reference to ‘contemporary community standards,’ it is not clear whose community
standard applies . . . .”).
62. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16 (citing Interstate Cir., Inc. v. City of Dall., 390 U.S.
676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
63. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
64. [1868] 3 QB 360 (Eng.).
65. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, § 13:2. The Standard Established in Regina v. Hicklin,
in RIGHTS & LIABILITIES IN MEDIA CONTENT: INTERNET, BROADCAST, AND PRINT (2d ed.
2017) (citing Hicklin, [1868] 3 QB 360 at 363–64).
66. Id.
67. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
68. A Book Named ‘John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure’ v. Att’y
Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
69. See id.
70. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., To ‘Deprave and Corrupt,’ 38 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 401,
416 (1993) (reviewing EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE: THE LAW
OF OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS (1992)) (“Summary reversals of
lower-court obscenity convictions soon became routine in a process known as
‘Redrupping’ . . . .”).
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York.71 Under this process, if five Justices agreed under different legal
tests that the material was not obscene, the court would reverse
convictions summarily72 during a process known as “Movie Day.”73
The Burger Court revisited obscenity in Miller v. California74 and
created what is still known today as the Miller test.75 In Miller, Melvin
Miller mailed five unsolicited brochures to the manager of a
restaurant and his mother containing explicit pictures and drawings
of men and women engaged in a variety of sexual activities.76 The
State of California convicted Mr. Miller of violating a state statute
that made it a misdemeanor to knowingly distribute obscene
material.77
The Court initially noted that the First Amendment did not
protect obscenity, while recognizing that the Court had struggled in
previous cases to define it.78 Then, the Court outlined a
three-pronged test to guide the trier-of-fact in distinguishing
obscenity from other, protected speech:
(a) whether the average person applying contemporary
community standards would find the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.79
Thereafter, federal and state governments enacted obscenity
statutes that adopted the language of the three-pronged test from
71. See 386 U.S. 767, 770 (1967).
72. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 (1973) (“In the face of
this divergence of opinion the Court began the practice in Redrup v. New York, of
per curiam reversals of convictions for the dissemination of materials that, at least
five members of the Court, applying their separate tests, deemed not to be
obscene.”).
73. See Phyllis Schlafly, The Morality of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 99 (2008) (“The court held ‘movie day[s]’ where the Justices
and their clerks would watch the films at issue in pornography cases.”) (citing BOB
WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 198
(1979)).
74. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
75. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 612 n.7 (2002) (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at
16–18).
76. Miller, 413 U.S at 16–18.
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id. at 23.
79. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
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Miller.80 In a subsequent case, Pope v. Illinois, the Court held that the
trier of fact should apply local community standards to the first two
prongs and a national standard to the third prong.81
In the ensuing decades, the Miller test would face its greatest
challenge with the invention and proliferation of the Internet. The
Supreme Court threw down the gauntlet in Ashcroft v. ACLU, when
several members of the Court questioned the constitutionality of
applying aspects of the Miller test to Internet speech.82 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy opined that applying
local community standards might lead to the substantial suppression
of protected speech, writing:
A Web publisher in a community where avant garde culture
is the norm may have no desire to reach a national market;
he may wish only to speak to his neighbors; nevertheless, if
an eavesdropper in a more traditional, rural community
chooses to listen in, there is nothing the publisher can do.83
Justice Kennedy also questioned what it would mean to evaluate
Internet speech “as a whole,” when content on a webpage often
connects to other websites.84 The lower courts wrestled with these
questions when the Department of Justice, under President George
W. Bush, initiated a series of high-profile Internet obscenity
prosecutions.85 In United States v. Kilbride, for example, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that courts should apply a
national community standard when the obscenity prosecution
involved Internet speech.86 However, in United States v. Stagliano, a
federal district court found that the local standard was
constitutional.87 That court also addressed the “as a whole”
requirement in the context of a movie trailer posted on a
pornographic website.88 The court ruled that the trailer would not
be judged in isolation but in a broader context that would
80. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.1 (2017); A.C.A. § 5-68302(5) (2017); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 311 (2017).
81. 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987).
82. 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
83. Id. at 595–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 600 (quoting U.S.C. §§ 231(e)(6)(A), (C) (2017)).
85. See Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Obscenity Prosecutions and the Bush
Administration: The Inside Perspective of the Adult Entertainment Industry & Defense
Attorney Louis Sirkin, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 233, 235 (2007).
86. 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 2009).
87. 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 31–32 (D.D.C. 2010).
88. Id. at 33–35.
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encompass, at a minimum, the web page on which the trailer was
posted.89 In contrast, in United States v. Little, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that five video trailers posted
on a pornographic website were properly viewed as five separate
works.90
In United States v. Extreme Associates, the defendant, a purveyor of
Internet pornography, avoided the Miller test altogether and argued
that the obscenity statutes violated substantive due process.91 The
federal district court in Pennsylvania agreed and held that the
defendant had third-party standing under Craig v. Boren92 to assert
the rights of its customers.93 The court contended that, under Stanley
v. Georgia,94 the customers of the defendant had a fundamental right
to view whatever material they wanted in the privacy of their own
homes, and that the federal obscenity statutes placed an
impermissible burden on that right.95 The defendant’s argument
lost traction, however, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered the case,96 reversed the district court’s decision,
and returned to the Miller test.97
The Justice Department’s focus on obscenity prosecutions
under George W. Bush slowed during the Obama administration,98
but there is some indication that Attorney General Jeff Sessions will
revive it.99 In 2010, when District Court Judge Richard J. Leon
dismissed the obscenity charges against the defendant in United States
v. Stagliano, he expressed concern over the “difficult, challenging

89. Id. at 36–37.
90. 365 Fed. Appx. 159, 165 (11th Cir. 2010).
91. United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580 (W.D. Pa.
2005), rev’d, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
92. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
93. Extreme Assocs. Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
94. 394 U.S. 557, 560 (1969).
95. Extreme Assocs. Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
96. Extreme Assocs. Inc., 431 F.3d at 156.
97. Id. at 162.
98. See George Weaver, Obama Administration Fails Obscenity Test, WORLD NEWS
GROUP (Apr. 24, 2013, 9:45 AM), https://world.wng.org/2013/04/obama_admin
istration_fails_obscenity_test# [https://perma.cc/3DE9-2HQJ] (noting that in
2013, “[g]overnment prosecutors ha[d] tried only two adult obscenity cases since
2009”).
99. See Sessions Hearing: Obscenity, C-SPAN (Jan. 11, 2017), www.cspan.org/video/?c4644425/sessions-hearing-obscenity [https://perma.cc/5KYE75W2].
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and novel questions” the case raised for obscenity law.100 He stated,
“I hope that [higher] courts and Congress will give greater guidance
to judges in whose courtrooms these cases will be tried.”101 Thus, the
Miller test is still intact, but questions remain.
IV. THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST
The Burger Court also created the leading test for evaluating
whether a regulation of purely commercial advertising violates the
First Amendment. Known as the Central Hudson test, it comes from
the decision bearing its name—Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v.
Public Service Commission of N.Y.102
In the past, commercial speech received no free speech
protection. The Court declared in 1942 that “the Constitution
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising.”103 This rule reigned for three decades until
the Court finally recognized the value of commercial speech in the
mid-1970s.104 In 1976, the Court declared that the old rule was of
“doubtful validity”105 and declared that “the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable.”106
While the Court recognized that commercial speech received
free speech protection, it did not create a test for evaluating such
restrictions.107 The Court did so in Central Hudson, which involved
the constitutionality of a New York rule banning “promotional
advertising” by electrical utilities.108 In the decision, Justice Lewis
Powell crafted the Central Hudson test, writing:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech
to come within that provision, it at least must concern
100. Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. District Judge Drops Porn Charges Against Video Producer
John A. Stagliano, WASH. POST (July 17, 2010), www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/16/AR2010071605750.html [https://perma.cc/G
H4Z-4CQU].
101. Id.
102. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
103. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
104. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 6.2 (2012) [hereinafter HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES].
105. Va. State Bd. Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
759 (1976).
106. Id. at 765.
107. HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES, supra note 104, § 6.5.
108. Id.
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lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.109
Under the Central Hudson test the first prong—the threshold
prong—asks: does the speech “concern lawful activity” and is it
non-misleading?110 If the speech at issue meets this prong, then the
Central Hudson test involves analysis of three additional prongs: (1)
the government must have a substantial interest; (2) the regulation
must directly and materially advance the government’s substantial
interest; and (3) the regulation must be narrowly tailored.111 The
Central Hudson test is a form of intermediate scrutiny,112 as the
government only has to put forth a substantial governmental interest,
rather than a compelling governmental interest in a strict scrutiny
analysis.113 Furthermore, the government does not have to justify its
restriction as the least restrictive means.114
The Central Hudson test remains the dominant test in
commercial speech jurisprudence.115 However, several Justices have
criticized it. Justice Clarence Thomas called for its abdication in his
concurring opinion in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, writing:

109. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
110. Id. at 564 (stating that under such circumstances, “the government’s power
is more circumscribed”).
111. Id. at 566; HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES, supra note 104, § 6.5.
112. Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the Constitutional Protection of
Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV. 527, 537 (2013).
113. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (requiring only a substantial government
interest to restrict commercial speech); Rostron, supra note 112, at 537 (“The Court
has emphasized that [the Central Hudson test] is a ‘lesser’ level of protection than
that afforded to other types of speech.”). But cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432
(1984) (“[T]o pass constitutional muster” under the Fourteenth Amendment,
governmental actions “must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest . . . .”); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541(1942) (introducing the
concept of “strict scrutiny” in reviewing the constitutionality of a government action
under the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time in a Supreme Court case).
114. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (“We . . .
conclude that the reason of the matter requires something short of a
least-restrictive-means standard.”).
115. HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES, supra note 104, § 6.5 (“[T]he so-called
Central Hudson test . . . still predominates in commercial speech jurisprudence.”).

2018

WILL FIRST AMENDMENT BURGER TESTS CONTINUE?

65

In my view, the Central Hudson test asks the courts to weigh
incommensurables—the value of knowledge versus the
value of ignorance—and to apply contradictory premises—
that informed adults are the best judges of their own
interests, and that they are not. Rather than continuing to
apply a test that makes no sense to me when the asserted
state interest is of the type involved here, I would return to
the reasoning and holding of Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy.116
In the same decision, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that he
“share[d] Justice Thomas’s discomfort with the Central Hudson test,
which seems to have nothing more than policy intuition to support
it.”117 Additionally, numerous legal commentators have criticized the
commercial speech doctrine and the Central Hudson test. Judge Alex
Kozinski and Stuart Banner famously critiqued the doctrine in their
oft-cited article Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?.118 In their article,
the authors disagreed with the notion that it is easier to identify the
truth or falsity of commercial speech than it is of other forms of
speech.119 They also questioned whether commercial speech was
more durable than other forms of speech.120 Additionally, the
authors demonstrated the difficulty in determining whether speech
should be classified as commercial speech, noncommercial speech,
or some mixture.121 Another leading commentator has referred to
the current protection of commercial speech as “half-hearted.”122

116. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 528 (1996) (J., Thomas
concurring). But see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that commercial speech may not be
restricted at the expense of public knowledge about lawful competitive pricing
terms).
117. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627 (1990).
119. Id. at 635.
120. Id. at 637–38 (challenging the oft-held “durability” justification by
juxtaposing commercial speech against other major profit generating—yet fully
protected—forms of speech like films, music recordings, and books).
121. Id. at 639–41 (illustrating the difficulty in speech classification by analyzing
an early 1990s Diet Pepsi commercial and concluding that little—in form or
substance—separates a “theatrical” commercial, merely telling a story involving the
product, and a “not much more thought-out” film).
122. Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial
Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 554 (1997).
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Still another commentator has referred to the Central Hudson test as
a “malleable standard that has resulted in inconsistent outcomes.”123
The Court edged closer to applying more than intermediate
scrutiny in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.124 Here, while faced with a First
Amendment challenge to state regulation of prescriber-related
information, the Court held that content based restrictions on
commercial speech should receive “heightened judicial scrutiny.”125
However, the Court proceeded to apply the Central Hudson test.126
This prompted one commentator to refer to the test as “the Central
Hudson Zombie.”127
The U.S. Supreme Court has moved closer to applying more
than intermediate scrutiny to at least some forms of commercial
speech regulation.128 However, the Central Hudson test has proven
“oddly resilient.”129 It remains the dominant test used by lower courts
in commercial speech cases.130
V. CONCLUSION
The Burger Court impacted First Amendment jurisprudence,
primarily through the creation of leading tests and standards for

123. See Kayla R. Burns, Note, Reducing the Inherent Malleability of Mid-Level
Scrutiny in Commercial Speech: A Proposed Change to the Second, Third, and Fourth Prongs
of the Central Hudson Test, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1579, 1584 (2011); see also Brian J.
Waters, Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First Amendment Demands
Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV.
1626, 1628 (1997) (“[T]he [Central Hudson] test has often been applied
inconsistently, resulting in uncertain First Amendment protection for commercial
speech.”).
124. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
125. Id. at 557, 565.
126. Id. at 577–80.
127. See generally Oleg Shik, Note, The Central Hudson Zombie: For Better or Worse,
Intermediate Tier Review Survives Sorrell v. IMS Health, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 561 (2015).
128. Rostron, supra note 112, at 551 (noting that in Sorrell the Supreme Court
“held that Vermont had no legitimate interest” in restricting pharmaceutical
representatives’ communication with physicians); see also Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 579–80.
129. Rostron, supra note 112, at 546.
130. See, e.g., Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir.
2017);
Kiser v. Kamdar, 831 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2016); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d
518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

2018

WILL FIRST AMENDMENT BURGER TESTS CONTINUE?

67

lower courts to apply.131 Three of those tests—the Lemon test,132 the
Miller test,133 and the Central Hudson test134—remain governing law
decades later.135 Future First Amendment cases will demonstrate if
the Roberts Court will flip these Burger Court precedents.136

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Hudson, Jr., Roberts Court, supra note 7.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
Hudson, Jr., Roberts Court, supra note 7.
Id.

